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Abstract. The main purpose of this study is to develop a
methodology for a multidisciplinary nuclear risk and vulner-
ability assessment, and to test this methodology through es-
timation of a nuclear risk to population in the Northern Eu-
ropean countries in case of a severe accident at the nuclear
risk sites. For assessment of the probabilistic risk and vul-
nerability, a combination of social-geophysical factors and
probabilities are considered.
The main focus of this paper is the description of method-
ology for evaluation of the atmospheric transport of radioac-
tive releases from the risk site regions based on the long-term
trajectory modeling. The suggested methodology is given
from the probabilistic point of view. The main questions
stated are: What are probabilities and times for radionu-
clide atmospheric transport to different neighbouring coun-
tries and territories in case of the hypothetical accidental re-
lease at the nuclear risk site? Which geographical territories
or countries are at the highest risk from the hypothetical ac-
cidental releases?
To answer these questions we suggest applying the fol-
lowing research tools for probabilistic atmospheric studies.
First tool is atmospheric modelling to calculate multiyear for-
ward trajectories originated over the sites. Second tool is
statistical analyses to explore temporal and spatial structure
of calculated trajectories and evaluate different probabilistic
impact indicators: atmospheric transport pathways, airflow,
fast transport, typical transport time, maximum possible im-
pact zone, maximum reaching distance, etc. These indicators
are applicable for further GIS-analysis and integration to es-
timate regional risk and vulnerability in case of accidental
releases at the risk sites and for planning the emergency re-
sponse and preparedness systems.
Correspondence to: A. A. Baklanov
(alb@dmi.dk)
1 Introduction
The risks for airborne radioactive contamination and signif-
icant radiological consequences connected with sources in
the Euro-Arctic region, in some cases predominantly affect
the conditions at local and regional levels, yet in others ap-
pear to be far reaching, and of considerable concern for the
whole region of concern. Thus, it is of particular interest to
expound on issues such as:
• Which sources appear to be the main concern for those
living close to and far from these sources?
• Which territories or countries are at the highest risk
from the hypothetical accidental releases from nuclear
risk sites?
For estimation of the potential nuclear risk and vulnerability
levels, and for regional planning of radiological environmen-
tal monitoring networks and emergency preparedness sys-
tems, it is very important to determine for the nuclear risk
sites (NRSs) of concern:
• geographical regions, territories, and/or countries most
likely to be impacted;
• probabilities and times for various characteristics of at-
mospheric transport to geographical regions (including
removal or precipitation factor) and their temporal and
spatial variability;
• worst-case meteorological and accidental scenarios for
detailed case studies;
• possible contamination and effects on population in
case of an accident;
• site-sensitive hazards of potential airborne radioactive
release;
© European Geosciences Union 2004
486 A. A. Baklanov and A. G. Mahura: Methodology for probabilistic atmospheric studies
• vulnerability to a radioactive deposition concerning its
persistence in the regional ecosystems:
• regional risks, socio-economical, and geographical con-
sequences for different geographical areas and popula-
tion groups.
Previously, several studies discussed possible approaches,
and preliminarily investigated some of the mentioned impor-
tant issues (e.g. see overview Baklanov, 2003). To study the
possible consequences and risks from NRSs there could be
two approaches – the case studies assessment (CSA) and the
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). The CSA is commonly
used for estimation of possible doses for population. This ap-
proach is very useful to estimate possible consequences for
typical or worst-case accidental scenarios and weather situ-
ations. However, it is computationally expensive for long-
term (multiyear) simulation and further probabilistic assess-
ments. Moreover, it is inconvenient for an analysis of factors
of different nature (for example, geophysical processes of ra-
dionuclide transport and social-economical factors).
So, alongside with the first approach, for PRA some
authors used simple dispersion models (mostly on a lo-
cal scale). For example, the first map of risk due to se-
vere accidents for majority of the European nuclear power
plants (NPPs) showed the probability of excess cancer deaths
(Slaper et al., 1994). The shortcoming of this approach was a
limitation by a short distance, because the radioactive plume
dispersion was evaluated by a simple Gaussian model us-
ing meteorological data only from one station. Andreev et
al. (1998) simulated dispersion and deposition with a La-
grangian particle model and calculated the frequency of ex-
ceedance of certain thresholds for 137Cs (regarded as a risk
indicator). Additionally, GIS-based export/import matrices
of risk were calculated for the European countries. Short-
coming of this method is the use of a limited number of me-
teorological situations, which can not satisfactory represent
a long-term statistics.
Therefore, for PRA on a regional level some authors
suggested to use more economical trajectory modelling ap-
proach. It should be noted that this approach was used for
estimation of impacts from various air pollutants as shown by
Eliassen and Saltbones (1983); other type of the probabilis-
tic approach, based on the ensemble methods, was realized
by Galmarini et al. (2001) for nuclear emergency prepared-
ness. For the nuclear risk sources, for example, Mahura et
al. (1999), Baklanov et al. (2002b) used an isentropic trajec-
tory model and cluster analysis technique to assess possible
impacts of the hypothetical nuclear accidents in the north-
ern regions. In particular, the long-term consequences for
the Nordic countries population were estimated on a basis of
the Chernobyl accident exposures in Scandinavia (Moberg,
1991; Dahlgaard, 1994). Mapping of the regional nuclear
risk and vulnerability was realized for Scandinavia based
on integration of mathematical modelling and GIS-analysis
(Rigina and Baklanov, 2002). Saltbones et al. (2000) also
performed the long-term trajectory modelling and evaluated
a few case studies of the long-range transport from the Kola
NPP. However, they used 2-D trajectories, and risk mapping
was not realized.
The studies of possible regional risk from the North-West
Russian NRSs were initiated in 1991 in bounds of the “Risk”
Project of the Russian State Programme “Ecological Safety
of Russia” and projects in cooperation with the Kola NPP
(Baklanov et al., 1992, 1994). These studies were contin-
ued during 1995–1997, and extended for NRSs of the Bar-
ents region in a series of international pilot studies/projects
where the dispersion modelling, system analysis, and ranging
of possible risk from different sites were employed (IIASA,
1996; Bergman and Baklanov, 1998; Bergman et al., 1998).
During 1996–1997,another study was performed for the Bili-
bino NPP using trajectory modelling and cluster analysis to
evaluate atmospheric transport pathways from NPP to the
State of Alaska (Jaffe et al., 1997a; Mahura, 1998). Dur-
ing 1997–1998, a similar study which included more de-
tailed probabilistic and several specific cases analyses, was
realized for the Kola NPP (Jaffe et al., 1997b; Baklanov et
al., 2001). During 1998–2000, for multidisciplinary analysis
of nuclear risk in the Barents region the “Risk and Nuclear
Waste” Programme was initiated (Baklanov and Bergman,
1999; ¨OCB, 2000; Baklanov et al., 2001; Mahura et al.,
2001). At the same period, the INTAS Project supplemented
the ¨OCB Project (Bergman, 1999; INTAS, 2000). Moreover,
a joint study of the DMI and Novosibirsk Computing Centre
of Russia suggested an alternative method for estimation of
nuclear risk and vulnerability, based on the sensitivity theory
and inverse modelling (Penenko and Baklanov, 2001).
So, it still remains an important issue to develop a method-
ology for the multidisciplinary nuclear risk and vulnerability
assessments. Therefore, the on-going project of the Nordic
countries “Atmospheric Transport Pathways, Vulnerability,
and Possible Accidental Consequences from the Nuclear
Risk Sites in the European Arctic” (AR-NARP, 2001–2003)
is an extension and integration of previous studies in this
field, and hence, the methodology (Baklanov and Mahura,
2001; Mahura and Baklanov, 2002; Baklanov et al., 2002b;
Baklanov et al., 2003), which is elaborating in bounds of this
project, is a logical continuation of our mentioned work.
2 Methodology
As it was mentioned, each of the two approaches – the proba-
bilistic risk assessment and the case studies assessment – has
some possibilities and shortcomings. Neither one of them
is sufficient for the complex risk assessments. Therefore, as
optimal, the following strategy for multidisciplinary method-
ology integrating different specific approaches is suggested:
• PRA approach for probabilistic atmospheric studies;
• combination of the PRA and CSA approaches;
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• radio-ecological sensitivity and specific nutrition path-
ways for studied regions;
• probabilistic safety assessments and probabilities of dif-
ferent severity accidents;
• possible social and economical loss and consequences;
• GIS-integration of different factors, probabilities, and
indicators for risk and vulnerability mapping.
2.1 General scheme for probabilistic risk assessment
General scheme for the suggested methodology of the prob-
abilistic risk assessments based on the long-term modelling
is shown in Fig. 1. For assessment the following items
should be considered:
1) social-geophysical factors:
• accident severity and release characteristics;
• proximity to risk sites and level of plume dispersion;
• population density in area;
• presence of critical groups of population;
• radio-ecological vulnerability of area;
• risk perception, preparedness of safety measures, emer-
gency preparedness systems;
• economical and technical means, counteracting conse-
quences of accident;
2) probabilities:
• probability of an accident of certain severity at the sites;
• probability of atmospheric transport from the sites to-
wards regions of interest;
• probability of radionuclide removal over regions during
atmospheric transport from the sites.
The following approaches and modelling tools are used in
the suggested methodology for PRA studies:
• Trajectory modelling (e.g. 3-D isentropic trajectory
model; Merrill et al., 1985) and 3-D DMI trajectory
model (Sørensen et al., 1994)) to calculate multiyear
forward trajectories originated over the NRS regions at
various altitudes;
• Cluster analysis (Mahura, 1998; Mahura et al., 1999;
Baklanov et al., 2002a) to identify atmospheric trans-
port pathways from NRSs;
• Probability fields analysis (Mahura, 2001; Baklanov et
al., 2002a) to construct monthly, seasonal, and annual
probability fields for airflow, fast transport, precipita-
tion factor, and other indicators to identify the most im-
pacted geographical regions;
• Long-range transport modelling (e.g. DERMA;
Sørensen, 1998; Baklanov and Sørensen, 2001) and
DMI-HIRLAM (Sass et al., 2000) models) to simulate
radionuclide transport and deposition for hypothetical
accidental releases at NRSs, and to compare with
results of trajectory modelling;
• Specific case studies (Bergman et al., 1998; Baklanov et
al., 2001, 2002a) to estimate consequences for environ-
ment and population after hypothetical accidents using
experimental models based on the Chernobyl effects for
the Nordic countries (Moberg, 1991; Galmarini et al.,
1992; Dahlgaard, 1994; Nielsen, 1998);
• Radioecological vulnerability to radioactive deposition
(Bergman and A˚gren, 1999; ØCB, 2000) to evaluate
vulnerability concerning its persistence in the ecosys-
tems with focus on transfer of certain radionuclides into
food chains of key importance for the intake and expo-
sure in a whole population and certain groups;
• Risk evaluation and mapping (Rigina, 2001; Rigina
and Baklanov, 2002) to analyze socio-economical con-
sequences for different geographical areas and var-
ious population groups taking into account social-
geophysical factors and probabilities and using geo-
graphic, demographic, administrative and economical
databases in combination with the GIS-analysis.
The main focus of this paper is to describe the aspects of
the suggested methodology for the probabilistic atmospheric
studies based on the trajectory modelling approach for fur-
ther risk and vulnerability analysis, namely the four upper
blocks of Fig. 1. Here we do not consider aspects of the
probabilistic dispersion and deposition modelling, which is
a topic of a separate paper. Regarding to the fifth block
shown in Fig. 1, the used GIS methods are discussed by Rig-
ina (2001), Rigina and Baklanov (2002). It is devoted to
problems of residential radiation risk and territorial vulner-
ability mapping with respect to NRSs. Their study suggested
two methods, based on an integration of the mathematical
modelling and GIS-based spatial analyses which allow merg-
ing together the separate aspects: probabilistic analysis, dose
estimation, modelling of consequences, etc.
2.2 Trajectory modelling approach
In general, each computed atmospheric trajectory represents
a pathway of an air parcel motion in time and space. There
are a few approaches to model atmospheric trajectories. Two
www.atmos-chem-phys.org/acp/4/485/ Atmos. Chem. Phys., 4, 485–495, 2004
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Fig. 1. Proposed scheme of the probabilistic risk assessment for
atmospheric studies.
of these approaches are commonly used: isobaric and isen-
tropic. The modelling of more realistic trajectories – “fully
3-D trajectories” – is preferable, although it is complex and
it requires incorporation into simulation of large number of
variables and parameters, and moreover, for the long-term
statistics it increases significantly a computational time. In
this study the isentropic approach was selected. Although
this type of trajectory modelling uses assumption of adia-
batically moving air parcels and neglects various physical
effects, it is still a useful research tool for evaluating com-
mon airflow patterns within meteorological systems on var-
ious scales. Some uncertainties in these models are related
to the interpolation of meteorological data, which might be
sparsely measured, applicability of the considered horizon-
tal and vertical scales, assumptions of vertical transport, etc.
(Merrill et al., 1985; Kahl, 1996; Stohl, 1998).
As input data, a gridded dataset – NCEP Global Tropo-
spheric Analyses – available at the NCAR archives was used.
The original gridded wind fields were interpolated to po-
tential temperature (isentropic) surfaces. It should be noted
that quality of trajectory calculation is highly dependent on
the original quality of the NCEP fields (2.5◦×2.5◦ latitude
vs. longitude), and it may not reflect the contribution of
the frontal passages and local terrain phenomena. However,
the trajectory errors rising during a single calculation might
be smoothed in further analysis due to the large number
of trajectories in the multiyear dataset. Among the higher-
resolution meteorological data, the DMI-HIRLAM (Sass et
al., 2000) and ECMWF archives which were used in 3-D tra-
jectory model (Sørensen et al., 1994) should be mentioned.
An interpolation procedure was performed for a multiyear
period (1991–1996) applying a technique described by Mer-
rill et al. (1985). Then, interpolated wind fields were used to
compute forward trajectories from the site regions at standard
UTC times at different potential temperature levels. These
levels ranged from 255◦ K to 330◦ K with a step of 5◦ K. In
general, less than two percent of trajectories were missing
because of absence of archived meteorological data.
Instead of calculating only one trajectory, four trajectories
for every calculation were used. The initial points of tra-
jectories are located at each corner of a 1◦×1◦ of latitude
vs. longitude box, where the site is in the centre of the box.
Calculation of four trajectories simultaneously allowed eval-
uating a consistency of the wind field in the direction of the
atmospheric transport. Although all calculated trajectories
were used for further analysis, it should be noted that there
are differences in the representation of the general flow along
trajectories. The flow is considered to be a reasonably con-
sistent along the transport pathway if all four trajectories had
shown a similar direction (reflecting convergence of flow) of
transport for one time period. Trajectories, showing a strong
divergence of flow, are assigned to a category of the “com-
plex trajectories”. These trajectories reflect more uncertain-
ties in the air parcel motion. These differences are not so im-
portant in evaluation of the general climatological patterns,
but they can be significant in, for example, identification of
source regions for air pollutants, evaluation of the nature of
the specific events with recorded elevated concentration of
species, tracking tracers in the atmosphere, etc.
For all NRSs, the most probable release heights would be
within the boundary layer, i.e. within several hundred meters
above the ground. Therefore, at the next step, from all trajec-
tories only those trajectories originating at altitudes not more
than 500 m were selected. The chosen trajectories for further
statistical analysis are limited by duration of 5 days. This
limitation was decided to use because of 1) quality and accu-
racy of trajectory calculations after 5 days drops significantly,
2) observing development frames of the synoptic scales sys-
tems in the Euro-Arctic region, as well as 3) relative prox-
imity of the analyzed geographical regions from the sites of
interest. Moreover, to study altitudinal variations in the flow
patterns (in particular, within the boundary layer and free tro-
posphere), trajectories originated over the site regions at al-
titudes of 1.5 and 3 km above sea level (asl) could be also
considered.
2.3 Statistical analysis approach
2.3.1 Cluster analysis for atmospheric transport pathways
The cluster analysis is a variety of multivariate statistical
analysis techniques, which could be used to explore the ex-
isting structure within data sets. The specific purpose of this
analysis is to divide a data set into groups (or clusters) of sim-
ilar variables (or cases). Miller (1981) initiated application of
the cluster analysis on trajectories. The important output of
his study was evaluation of the airflow climatology, in partic-
ular, over the long time periods. Then later, cluster analysis
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techniques on trajectories were used extensively by various
researchers in different scientific fields.
In general, output of cluster analysis on trajectories can
provide insights in the tracers transport, common atmo-
spheric flow patterns for the sites of interest, identification
of the source regions for atmospheric pollutants, etc. The
cluster analysis is used to divide calculated trajectories into
groups, which represent the major airflow transport regimes.
The following criteria are used: latitude and longitude values
at each time interval of trajectory. These represent both di-
rection and velocity of air parcel motion. Similarity among
trajectories in each cluster is maximized considering the full
length of each forward trajectory. Within each cluster, indi-
vidual trajectories can be averaged to obtain the mean clus-
ter trajectory (or atmospheric transport pathway). Thus, the
original large data set of trajectories can be reduced to a small
number of mean cluster plots. These plots then can be inter-
preted, based on common synoptic conditions and features,
and hence, the airflow climatology for the site can be sum-
marized.
2.3.2 Probability fields analysis for probabilistic impact in-
dicators
Probabilistic analysis is one of the ways to estimate the likeli-
hood of occurrence of one or more phenomena or events. For
each site a large number of forward trajectories that passed
over various geographical regions was calculated. Each cal-
culated trajectory contains information about longitude, lat-
itude, altitude, pressure, temperature, relative humidity, etc.
at each modelling time interval (in this study – 12 h). The
probability fields for these mentioned characteristics, either
individual or combined, can be represented by a superposi-
tion of probabilities for air parcels reaching each grid area in
the chosen domain or on a geographical map.
Let us consider several common approaches to construct
probability fields based on trajectory modelling results (Bak-
lanov and Mahura, 2001; Mahura, 2001; Mahura and Bak-
lanov, 2002). For all approaches, initially, a gridded domain
having Mlat×Mlon latitude vs. longitude grid points with a
size of 1Y×1X degrees latitude vs. longitude should be
constructed. The selection of sizes 1Y and 1X depends on
the resolution of original meteorological fields used for cal-
culation of trajectories. The number of latitudinal and longi-
tudinal grid points – Mlat and Mlon – is selected taking into
account the farthest geographical boundaries which might be
reached by air masses during the period studied. Time t is
the output modelling time interval which is equal 12 h for
our study.
The first approach to construct such fields considers the
number of trajectory intersections with each cell of the grid-
ded domain (NCELLij ):
NCELLij =
Ntr∑
k=1
Mlat∑
j=1
Mlon∑
i=1
nijk,
nijk =
{
0
1 if
{
Xi ≤ Xk,t < Xi+1
Yj ≤ Yk,t < Yj+1 , (1)
where:
• Yk,t , Yk,t – longitude and latitude of k−trajectory at
time t ;
• Xi, Xi+1 – longitudinal boundaries of the grid cells of
the gridded domain;
• Yj , Yj+1 – latitudinal boundaries of the grid cells of the
gridded domain;
• Ntr – total number of trajectories during the period stud-
ied (number of days considered ∗ 8 trajectories per day);
• Mlat , Mlon – number of the grid points in domain along
latitude and longitude.
The second approach for construction of probabilistic
fields uses an assumption that the total sum of contributions
from all individual grid cells of domain is equal to 100%.
Hence, the contribution or probability that a given trajectory
might reach the geographical boundaries of the individual
cell could be estimated as follows:
Pi,j =
NCELLij
Ntot
· 100%
Ntot =
Mlat∑
i=1
Mlon∑
j=1
NCELLi,j , (2)
where:
• Pi,j – probability of trajectory intersections with a par-
ticular cell of the gridded domain;
• Ntot – total number of trajectory intersections with all
cells of the gridded domain.
The third approach for construction of probabilistic fields
uses an assumption that for an individual site there is always
a region where there is the highest probability of the maxi-
mum possible impact due to atmospheric transport. The de-
tailed description of this approach is given in Sect. 2.4.1. In
our study, the third approach to construct the probabilistic
fields was selected as the most representative to evaluate the
site possible impact compared with the previous two.
It should be noted that the most interest for further analysis
would be the following indicators, based on the probabilis-
tic fields: 1) airflow and fast transport, 2) maximum possi-
ble impact zone and maximum reaching distance, 3) typical
transport time, and 4) precipitation factor.
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Fig. 2. Annual airflow probability field from the Leningrad nuclear
power plant (isolines are shown in % with respect to the area of the
highest probability of possible impact).
Fig. 3. Annual fast transport probability field after 24 h of atmo-
spheric transport from the Leningrad nuclear power plant (isolines
are shown in % with respect to the area of the highest probability of
possible impact).
2.4 Indicators of the nuclear risk site possible impact
2.4.1 Airflow and fast transport probability fields
The first type of probabilistic fields (airflow probability field,
Fig. 2 shows the common features in the atmospheric trans-
port patterns, i.e. it may provide a general insight on the pos-
sible main direction of the radioactive cloud transport as well
as the possibility to reach or pass over any geographical area.
The result of this analysis is an appropriate test to support
or disprove results of the cluster analysis. This is because
the atmospheric transport pathways (or mean trajectory clus-
ters) show only the common direction of airflow away from
the site. However, information between these pathways (or
clusters) is missing.
The second type of probabilistic fields (fast transport prob-
ability field, Fig. 3 indicates the probability of the air parcels
movement during the first day of transport. It is important in-
formation, especially, for estimating the short-living radionu-
clides – such as iodine isotopes – impact. These fast trans-
port fields show those territories that may be reached after
the first day, and those areas that are at the most danger due
to fast transport probability.
These two types of probability fields are constructed using
the third approach (see Sect. 2.3.2) based on assumption
that for an individual site there is always a region where
possible impact due to atmospheric transport might be the
highest. The borders of such region could be estimated by
comparing the number of trajectory intersections in the cells
with the cell where the maximum number of intersections
occurred: NAMC=max
{
NCELL1,1 , ..., NCELLMlat ,Mlon
}
.
Hence, among all grid cells, the cell where the absolute
maximum of intersections occurred would be identified as
an “absolute maximum cell” (AMC). Because all trajectories
start near the site region, to account for the contribution
into the flow at larger distances from the site, the number
of intersections in cells adjacent to AMC was compared,
and then assigned additional cells, which had difference of
less than 10% between cells. Therefore, this new “area of
maxima”, if isolines are drawn, will represent the area of the
highest probability of the possible impact (AHPPI) from the
site. Assuming a value of 100% for this area, the rest could
be re-calculated as percentage of the area at the highest
probability of the possible impact, or:
PAHPMIi,j =
NCELLij
ND
· 100%,
ND = Ntot −NAHPMI ,
NAHPMI =
Mlat∑
j=1
Mlon∑
i=1
nij ,
nij =
{
0
NCELLi,j if NCELLi,j ≥ 0.9 ·NAMC , (3)
where:
• PAHPMIi,j – probability of the NRS impact with respect
to the area of the highest probability of the possible im-
pact (AHPPI) of the nuclear risk site;
• ND – total sum of trajectory intersections with cells
from the gridded domain, except the cells located in the
boundaries of AHPPI for the nuclear risk site;
• NAHPMI – total sum of trajectory intersections with
cells from the gridded domain located within the bound-
aries of AHPPI for the nuclear risk site.
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For example, as shown in Fig. 2, the isolines start from
“10” (%) and show contribution of cells into the total redistri-
bution of the airflow around the site with respect to AHPPI.
For this case, the boundaries of AHPPI (extended more in
east-south sector from the site) are outlined by the isoline of
“>90” (%). This field also shows dominance of the westerly
flows from the NRS region.
2.4.2 Maximum possible impact zone and maximum
reaching distance
The third type of probabilistic fields, first, indicates bound-
aries of regions with the highest probability of being reached
by trajectories during the first day of atmospheric transport
from the risk sites. Let’s call this indicator the maximum
possible impact zone (MPIZ). Second, this type of the field
also indicates the farthest boundaries on the geographical
map that might be reached during the first day by, at least,
one trajectory originating over the NRS location. Let’s call it
the maximum reaching distance (MRD).
To visualize the MPIZ indicator, all endpoints of calcu-
lated trajectories originated within the boundary layer were
also counted (such calculation can be done for any other
layer or altitude) during the first day of transport (at 12 and
24 h). Then, a similar approach for construction of proba-
bility fields (as was used for the airflow and fast transport
probability fields; see Sect. 2.4.1) was used to construct the
MPIZ field. An isoline of MPIZ was drawn through the areas
with the highest occurrence of trajectory intersections with
the cells of the gridded domain (Fig. 4).
To visualize the MRD indicator, all endpoints of calculated
trajectories at the end of the first day of atmospheric transport
were used. An isoline of MRD was drawn through the grid
cells where, at least, one trajectory intersected with the grid
cell boundaries (Fig. 4). It should be noted also, that although
the likelihood that an air parcel will reach these boundaries
is low, it is still a possible case of atmospheric transport from
the site.
2.4.3 Typical transport time fields
In the emergency response systems for nuclear accidents, the
estimation of the radionuclide transport time to a particular
territory, region, county, city, etc. is one of the important in-
put parameters in the decision-making process. This infor-
mation is extracted from the calculated isentropic trajectories
and constructed the fourth type of probabilistic fields called
the typical transport time (TTT) fields. These fields show:
first, how long, typically, it will take for an air parcel to reach
a particular geographical region from the NRS location, and
second, what territories would be at the highest risk during
the first few days of radionuclide cloud transport after an ac-
cident at NRS.
To construct the TTT fields, at the first step, a new polar
grid domain having 36 sectors (10◦ each) and 35 grid cells
Fig. 4. Annual boundaries of the maximum reaching dis-
tance (–LNP MRD–) and maximum possible impact zone
(–LNP MPIZ–) indicators for the Leningrad nuclear power plant.
(2◦ each) along each sector line with the risk site in the cen-
ter was built (although any other resolution of a grid domain
could be chosen). At the second step, in the same way as in
the probability fields analysis, the number of trajectory inter-
sections was counted in each grid cell of new domain. Then,
along each sector a grid cell with absolute maximum of tra-
jectory intersections was selected, and an isoline of typical
transport time was constructed.
A similar procedure is repeated for each selected temporal
term. As a step of this procedure, initially, the geographical
coordinates (latitude and longitude) were converted into po-
lar coordinates (radius R(Xt , Yt ) and polar angle α(Xt , Yt )):
R(Xt , Yt ) =
√
(Xt −XNRS)2 + (Yt − YNRS)2,
γ (Xt , Yt ) = arctan
(
(Yt − YNRS)
(Xt −XNRS)
)
,
α(Xt , Yt ) =

90− γ (Xt , Yt ) if N − E
90+ γ (Xt , Yt ) if E − S
180+ γ (Xt , Yt ) if S −W
270+ γ (Xt , Yt ) if W −N
, (4)
where:
• Xt , Yt – longitude and latitude of trajectory at time t ,
• Yt , YNRS – longitude and latitude of the NRS location,
• γ (Xt , Yt ) – angle calculated for one of quadrants.
Then, for each time t in each cell of the sector, a number
of trajectory intersectionsNCELLij (t)was counted, and com-
pared with the cells along the sector line to find a cell with
the absolute maximum of trajectory intersections NAMC(t):
NCELLij (t) =
Msec t∑
j=1
Mint∑
i=1
nij ,
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Fig. 5. Annual typical transport time fields at 1 (–1d–) and 2 (–2d–)
days of atmospheric transport from the Leningrad nuclear power
plant.
nij =
{
0
1 if
{
Rgridi,j ≤ R(Xt , Yt ) < Rgridi+1,j+1
αgridi,j ≤ α(Xt , Yt ) < αgridi+1,j+1 , (5)
where:
• Rgrid , αgrid – radius and angle of grid points in the grid-
ded domain;
• Msec t ,Mint – total number of grid points of the grid-
ded domain (36 sectors×10◦ and 35+1+35=71 intervals
×2◦, respectively).
For simplicity, if several AMC cells were identified along
the sector line then the closest to the site was selected for con-
struction of the TTT field (example of one- and two-day TTT
is shown for the Leningrad NPP in Fig. 5. It should be noted
that the TTT fields’ construction for the terms later than 2.5–
3 days is complicated due to significant airflow propagation
from the site locations, and hence, the later terms isolines are
not concentrated around the site and less representative.
2.4.4 Removal or precipitation factor
The wet deposition is an issue of most concern during atmo-
spheric transport of radionuclide cloud over the geographical
territories. It is highly temporally and spatially dependent.
It plays important role in the estimation of the radionuclide
surface deposition. To analyze the possible contribution of
the removal processes during atmospheric transport from the
NRS locations we might apply at least three different ap-
proaches.
The first approach is based on the evaluation of the pre-
cipitation climatology for the particular geographical area.
Such climatological maps (on a multiyear and seasonal ba-
sis for the large scale domains) might be obtained from the
meteorological weather services. These maps would reflect
the accumulated precipitation measured near the surface for
Fig. 6. Spring relative humidity (values are given in %) or “precip-
itation factor” fields within the boundary layer for the Kola nuclear
power plant.
each interval of time. It may be used for identification of
the large size areas having common precipitation patterns.
In particular, on such maps these areas are connected with
the major centers of synoptic activity. However, air parcels
might travel within different atmospheric layers during their
transport from the NRS region. For example, if an air parcel
travels in the free troposphere and there is no precipitation in
this layer, but the area is marked as precipitable at the clima-
tological map that will raise a misleading concern.
Therefore, the second approach is based on the evalua-
tion of the probabilistic fields for the “precipitation factor”
( ¨OCB, 2000; INTAS, 2000; Mahura et al., 2001). An ex-
ample is shown in Fig. 6. Relative humidity “plays a role”
of the precipitation factor. At each selected time interval for
each forward trajectory additional parameters including rela-
tive humidity can be calculated. It is one of the factors, which
will determine the possibility of radionuclide removal during
transport. Increasing relative humidity in the atmosphere is
one of the signals of the water vapor increasing presence,
and it may, in the presence of the cloud condensation nuclei,
lead to formation of cloud cover. After clouds develop and
form, under certain conditions there is a possibility of pre-
cipitation, and hence, radionuclide removal. Construction of
the relative humidity fields is similar to the first steps in the
probability field analysis. In this case, an average value of
the relative humidity in each grid cell was calculated. Both
the precipitation and relative humidity fields have a cellular
figure in comparison with the airflow pattern. A pitfall in
this analysis is the fact that all relative humidity values are
directly related to the existing flow pattern. So, each field is
valid only with respect to a particular risk site. Nevertheless,
it is a more realistic pattern of the possible removal during
transport than calculating rainfall climatological maps used
in the first approach, because it includes processes above the
surface. The limitation always is how we might resolve pre-
cipitation processes during air parcels transport. To resolve
them we would need a finer meteorological data resolution.
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The third approach is based on the direct evaluation of the
wet deposition fields at the ground surface (Baklanov et al.,
2002b). It is also required to have multiyear output fields for
comparison. For these purposes, we might run a dispersion
and deposition model for a long-term period. Although this
way is more accurate, it is more expensive computationally.
3 Conclusions
The methodology for assessment of nuclear risk and vulner-
ability for population in different geographical regions and
countries in case of a severe accident at nuclear risk sites
(NRSs) was outlined and discussed. The social-geophysical
factors and indicators of the NRS possible impact which de-
pend on the location of the area of interest and its population,
were considered
The evaluation of atmospheric transport is given from the
probabilistic point of view. In bounds of the probabilistic at-
mospheric studies several research tools were recommended
to apply: (i) long-term trajectory modelling, (ii) a set of sta-
tistical methods to analyze trajectory modelling results, and
(iii) constructing and mapping probabilistic fields of different
NRS possible impact indicators due to atmospheric transport.
Several useful indicators and methods of their construction
were suggested and given. The indicators, based on results
of trajectory modelling, are the following:
• atmospheric transport pathways,
• airflow probability fields,
• fast transport probability fields,
• typical transport time fields,
• maximum reaching distance,
• maximum possible impact zone,
• removal or precipitation factor.
It is assumed that these indicators will be applicable for
further GIS-based analysis with integration of mathematical
modelling to estimate risk and vulnerability as well as for the
planning of emergency response and preparedness systems in
cases of accidental releases at NRSs. The applicability of the
methodology includes also:
• initial preliminary estimates of the atmospheric trans-
port probability in event of an accidental release at NRS;
• improvement of systems for monitoring and emergency
response to accidental releases;
• input for the social and economical studies of conse-
quences due to the NRS impact on population and envi-
ronment of the neighbouring territories and countries;
• input for the multidisciplinary risk and vulnerabil-
ity analyses, probabilistic assessment of radionuclide
local-, regional-, and long-range transport;
• modelling and testing of the higher resolution models.
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